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Notes
Missouri Adds Suspenders to a Job
Accomplished by a Belt: Application of FRE
702 to Psychologists' Testimony on Medical
Causation
Landers v. Chrysler Corp.'
I. INTRODUCTION
In this day of major scientific advances and new technology, the role of
expert witnesses is of vital importance. In the American legal system, expert
opinions are the most common source of specialized knowledge.2 The expert
opinion facilitates the trier of fact in making an "intelligent evaluation of facts"
that untrained laymen would be unqualified to make? Unsurprisingly, courts are
constantly determining whether certain witnesses rise to the level of an expert.4
Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 702 enumerates the test for qualifying a witness
as an expert.
The possibility of a psychologist as an expert witness has currently created
ajurisdictional conflict. Courts are not questioning the psychologist's ability to
testify as an expert witness on psychological matters. Rather, courts have
reached inconsistent results on the issue of whether psychologists are expert
witnesses for the purpose of medical causationissues.'
Missouri courts were confronted with this issue for the first time in Landers
v. Chrysler Corporation.6 The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern
District permitted a psychologist to testify on medical causation issues. The
decision is distinguishable from other contrary decisions on the issue because
Missouri uniquely preserves the case-by-case approach that is mandated by FRE

1. 963 S.W.2d 275 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
2. FED. R. EviD. 702 advisory committee's note.
3. Id.
4. The classification as an expert witness is important because the Federal Rules
of Evidence allow an expert witness a broader basis of testimony as opposed to a lay
witness. Compare FED. R. EVID. 703 (opinion testimony by experts), with FED. R. Evm.
701 (opinion testimony by lay witnesses).
5. Medical causation testimony discussed in this Note excludes the distinct issue
of testimony by a psychologist regarding the proper standard of care in a medical
malpractice action, which would almost certainly be outside the realm of a psychologist's
expert testimony.
6. Landers v. Chrysler Corp., 963 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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702. This Note will explain why the Missouri approach is correct and why any
other decision would dilute the meaning of FRE 702.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Plaintiff Doyle Landers, an auto worker, filed a worker's compensation
claim with an administrative law judge (ALJ) against Defendant Chrysler
Corporation over a work-related injury.7 Unsatisfied with the ALJ decision,
Defendant Chrysler filed an application for review with the Labor and Industrial
Relations Commission (Commission).8 When the Commission affirmed the
AL's decision, Defendant commenced this action by appealing the claim to the
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District.9
At his work site on September 13, 1989, Landers was hit on the top of the
head by a skyhook.'" Although he could not recall much of the incident, Landers
did remember falling to his knees after he was hit."
Landers was treated at Defendant's dispensary soon after the incident' He
was later taken to St. Joseph's Hospital where he remained for seven days.'3
While at the hospital, Landers was examined by neurosurgeon Dr. David
Wilkinson. 4 Dr. Wilkinson found that Landers had a cerebral concussion, postconcussion syndrome, cervical sprain with cervical spur, and a scalp laceration. ' s
At a follow-up examination on September 29, 1989, Dr. Wilkinson concluded
that Landers was totally incapacitated for an indefinite time and directed him to
remain off work.'6
After this examination, Defendant's claim manager referred Landers to Dr.
Patrick Hogan, who examined Landers on October 4, 1989.' 7 Dr. Hogan
performed a neurological examination and concluded that Landers suffered from
a head injury with complications of headaches and light headedness.' 8 Dr.
Hogan determined that Landers did not suffer a concussion as a result of the
accident.' He further concluded that Landers' loss of memory, inability to
express himself, and depression were not related to the accident.2" Dr. Hogan

7. Id. at 277.

8. Id. at 279.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 277.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.

15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.

18. Landers, 963 S.W.2d at 278.
19. Id.
20. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/4
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found that Landers had a five to eight percent permanent partial disability and
would not need further medical treatment as a result of the accident.21
Additionally, Dr. Hogan found that the injury did not prohibit Landers from
successfully performing his job.' He supported this finding by the fact that
Landers performed his duties for two years following the accident.'
Although not feeling fully restored, Landers returned to work on October
17, 1989. Defendant's dispensary records indicated Landers still complained
of dizziness, slurred speech, and slow response to questions.2 Fellow
employees reported that Landers had trouble performing his work accurately and
efficiently. 26 Furthermore, Landers' wife testified that Landers had mood swings
like "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde," and that he would keep himself in a dark room2
These comments led Landers' attorney to refer him to Dr. Thomas
Fitzgerald, a clinical psychologist.28 Dr. Fitzgerald performed a series of
neuropsychological tests on Landers in September and October of 1990.29 The
tests resulted in his conclusion that Landers suffered a closed head injury which
caused impaired retention and memory, poor concentration and attention,
inability to sequence, emotional liability, and fatiguability as a result of this
accident.30 Dr. Fitzgerald also found that Landers suffered a seventy-five to
eighty percent permanent partial disability as a result of the injury and would not
be employable by others based on his condition.3'
Landers was then examined by Dr. Richard Wetzel, another clinical
psychologist who practiced neuropsychology. 32 After performing a series of
cognitive tests on Landers, Dr. Wetzel concluded that he suffered from brain
dysfunction, depression, a lesion in his brain, and that he was seventy-five
percent disabled as a result of the injury.33
By request of Defendant, Dr. Wayne Stillings also examined Landers'
condition.' Dr. Stillings concluded that Landers did not suffer a concussion or
permanent brain injury and
that Landers suffered no permanent partial disability
3
as a result of the injury. 1

21. Id. at 279.
22. Id. at 278.

23. Id. at 279.
24. Landers, 963 S.W.2d at 278.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

34. Landers, 923 S.W.2d at 279.
35. Id.
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The ALJ first decided Landers' claim 36 on November 2, 1995, finding that
Landers' memory loss, inability to perform his job properly, personality
changes, concentration problems, speech problems, and depression were
connected to the work related injury. 3' The ALJ concluded that Landers suffered
a fifty percent permanent partial disability and was entitled to future medical
care.38 Defendant filed an application for review with the Labor and Industrial
Relations Commission, which affirmed the decision of the ALJ.3 9 Defendant
then appealed this decision to the Missouri Court of Appeals.4"
Defendant argued that the Commission erred as a matter of law in ruling
that Landers' alleged brain deficits were medically causally related to the workrelated injury 4Y Defendant argued the Commission's decision was not supported
by any competent or substantial evidence.42 Defendant also contended that the
evidence provided by Dr. Wetzel and Dr. Fitzgerald in support of Landers'
claim was inapplicable since the doctors were only clinical psychologists and not
medical doctors. As psychologists, they were not qualified to render an opinion
regarding whether Landers' brain deficits were medically causally related to the
accident.4 3 Defendant argued that the only competent evidence in the record was
that Landers suffered no brain injury as a result of the accident." Thus, the
Commission should not have upheld the AL's finding of fifty percent
permanent partial disability when the record lacked sufficient evidence to
support such a finding.
The Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District held that a clinical
psychologist may testify as an expert as to the causation of a claimant's
injuries.45 Furthermore, the Commission has discretion to determine the weight
to accord conflicting medical theories.46 The court thus affirmed the
Commission's finding.47

36. Id.
37. Id.

38. Id.
39. Id.

40. Id.
41. Id. The defendant raised two other points on appeal. In the second point, the
defendant argued that the Commission erred in awarding the plaintiff future medical
treatment for depression in that the depression was not related to a compensable injury
and there was no competent evidence to support the award. Id.at 282. In the third point,
the defendant argued that the Commission erred in finding that the plaintiff suffered a
50% permanent partial injury because it was not supported by substantial and competent
evidence. Id. at 284.
42. Landers,963 S.W.2d at 279.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 282.
46. Id.
47. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/4
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1I. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. FederalRule of Evidence 702 andMissouriRevised Statute
Section 490.065
Originally enacted in 1975, the Federal Rules of Evidence liberalized many
of the current rules of evidence for the federal courts. One such area of
liberalization was the broadening of standards for the admissibility of expert
testimony.4 8 The Federal Rules changed the emphasis from questions of
admissibilityto questions of weight of the evidence. Rule 702, the specific rule
governing the admission of expert testimony, states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue,
a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience,
training, or education, may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise.49

Like several other states, Missouri has adopted virtually the exact wording
of Rule 702 in Section 490.065 of the Missouri Revised Statutes. 50 The only
difference between Section 490.065 and Rule 702 is that Section 490.065 begins
"[i]n any civil action," while the remaining portion is identical to Rule 702.5
The rule essentially delineates two threshold requirements for someone to
offer their expert opinion. 2 First, through one of the five areas expressly listed,
the person must be established as an expert. Second, the evidence must be
helpful to the trier of fact.
Courts have universally found that psychologists are experts for purposes
of testifying about the existence of brain conditions or brain injuries." Courts
are now confronted with the question of whether those same psychologists may
render expert opinions as to the medical causes of such conditions and injuries.

48. Angela D. Slater, FederalStandardsfor Admissibility ofExpert Evidence on

Causation,61 DEF. COUNS. J. 51, 51 (1994).
49. FED. R. EVID. 702.
50. Mo. REv. STAT. § 490.065 (1994).
51. Id.
52. FED. R. EVID. 702. Since the court found the Missouri statute to be virtually
identical to FED. R EVID. 702, all cites herein will be to FED. R. EVID. 702.
53. See Executive Car & Truck Leasing, Inc. v. DeSerio, 468 So. 2d 1027, 1029
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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B. Psychologists and Causation
Although many courts have confronted the issue of psychologists testifying
as experts about causation, there is a wide disparity among the decisions. While
most courts have established bright line rules either expressly allowing or
prohibiting psychologists' testimony on medical causation, some courts have
taken intermediate approaches.
The majority of courts allow psychologists to testify on the causation of
injuries.' These courts look to their state rule analogous to FRE 702 and find
that the rule includes no restrictions against a psychologist testifying on medical
causation. These courts emphasize the liberal purpose for which the rule was
enacted.5 6 This approach is based on the belief that "it would be somewhat
anomalous to conclude [a psychologist] would not be qualified to testify about
[the cause of plaintiff's injury] when the neurologist who sought his expertise
and' ' 57assistance in diagnosing the disease would most likely be qualified to do
SO.

In Cunninghamv. Montgomery,8 the Oregon Court of Appeals reversed the
trial court's finding that a neuropsychologist was not able to testify on the issue
of causation.59 Plaintiff brought a malpractice action against a dentist for
cognitive damage she allegedly suffered from the dentist's negligent use of
nitrous oxide while treating the plaintiff for a toothache.' The trial court refused
to admit the psychologist's testimony concerning causation solely because he
was not a medical doctor.6 The appellate court found that the psychologist's
specialized training and experience qualified him to testify on causation despite
the fact that he was not a medical doctor.62 The court looked to FRE 70263 to
find that an "expert witness on a medical subject need not be a person licensed
to practice medicine."'

54. See Fabianke v. Weaver, 527 So. 2d 1253 (Ala. 1988); Hooper v. Industrial
Comm'n, 617 P.2d 538 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980); Valiulis v. Scheffels, 547 N.E.2d 1289 1L.
App. Ct. 1989); Hutchison v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d 882 (Iowa
1994); Cunningham v. Montgomery, 921 P.2d 1355 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
55. Hutchison, 514 N.W.2d at 889 (refusing to impose barriers other than
requirements of the rule).
56. Id. at 885 (recognizing Iowa's liberal rule on the admission of opinion
testimony).
57. Valiulis, 547 N.E.2d at 1297.
58. 921 P.2d 1355 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
59. Id. at 1360.
60. Id. at 1356.
61. Id. at 1358.
62. Id. at 1360.
63. Oregon's version of FED. L EVID. 702 is codified at OR. REv. STAT. § 40.410
(1997).
64. Cunningham v. Montgomery, 921 P.2d 1355, 1358 (Or. Ct. App. 1996).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/4

6

Turley: Turley: Missouri Adds Suspenders to a Job Accomplished by a Belt:

1998]

MEDICAL CA USA TION TESTIMONY

1005

Other courts have expressly prohibited psychologists from testifying on
issues concerning medical causation.65 These courts rationalize their decisions
on the basis that psychologists do not possess the medical training necessary to
render an opinion concerning causation.6 Further, many of the courts which
prohibit psychologists from testifying about causation look to state statutes
defining the practice of medicine and psychology as basis for their decisions.67
For example, in Huntoon v. TCI Cablevision of Colorado,' the Colorado
Court of Appeals barred a neuropsychologist from testifying on the issue of
causation.69 The court relied on the Colorado statutes which defined the practice
of medicine as treating the physical and mental aspects of the body and defined
psychology as treating solely the psychological aspects of the mind.7" In
Edmonds v. Illinois CentralGulfRailroadCo.,7 the Fifth Circuit also turned to
definitions of psychology in order to determine an expert's qualification. The
court found that the testifying clinical psychologist had "specialized training in
the application of psychological principles to the assessment and treatment of
people with psychological problems." The court found the psychologist was
"not a medical doctor, and not involved in making medical diagnosis."3
Therefore, the court concluded the psychologist's testimony concerning
was beyond the psychologist expertise and offered no assistance to the
causation
74
jury.
Between the two extreme positions, some courts have developed middle-ofthe-road approaches to determining whether or not a psychologist may testify on
causation. These approaches include: (1) prohibiting psychologists from
testifying about causation, but finding harmless error if causation testimony

65. See Edmonds v. Illinois Cent. Gulf R.R., 910 F.2d 1284, 1287 (5th Cir. 1990);
Huntoon v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 948 P.2d 33, 35 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997); Executive Car
& Track Leasing, Inc. v. DeSerio, 468 So. 2d 1027, 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985);
Chandler Exterminators, Inc. v. Morris, 416 S.E.2d 277, 277 (Ga. 1992), supersededby
statute as recognized in Drake v. LaRue Constr. Co., 451 S.E.2d 792 (Ga. Ct. App.
1995); Martin v. Benson, 481 S.E.2d 292, 296 (N.C. Ct. App. 1997), rev'd,500 S.E.2d
664 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).
66. ChandlerExterminators,416 S.E.2d at 278 ("Medical causation is not a subject
within the scope of psychological expertise."); Martin,481 S.E.2d at 296 ("[lIt is evident
that the practice of psychology does not include the diagnosis of medical causation.").
67. ChandlerExterminators,416 S.E.2d at 278 (comparing the statutory definitions
of "to practice psychology" and "to practice medicine"); Martin, 481 S.E.2d at 295
(examining the statutory definition of the "[p]ractice of psychology").
68. 948 P.2d 33 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).

69. Id. at 33.
70. Id.

71. 910 F.2d 1284 (5th Cir. 1990).
72. Id. at 1287.
73. Id.
74. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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existed,75 or (2) generally disallowing psychological testimony, but allowing it
76
when presented in conjunction with testimony from a physician.
Another intermediate approach was applied in RichardJoint Venture v.
Brunson.' In that case the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland applied an
estoppel argument against a defendant who argued that the psychologist's
testimony concerning causation was inadmissible.7" Prior to trial, the trial court
refused to qualify the testifying psychologist as an expert on the issue of
causation, ruling that the psychologist was to testify "strictly" within the area
of psychology.79 However, the record indicated the psychologist did testify on
causation issues.8 ° Despite this, the Court of Special Appeals refused to find
error in the psychologist's testimony because the issue of causation was elicited
from the psychologist by the defendant's counsel and not during plaintiff's direct
examination of the psychologist.8
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In Landers v. Chrysler Corp., the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern
District was forced to decide an issue of first impression: whether a
neuropsychologist was qualified to testify on causation of an organic brain
injury.8 2 The court looked at cases from other jurisdictions which came down
on both sides of the issue and ultimately decided to follow the majority of
jurisdictions, which allow the psychologist to testify on medical causation. 3
The court rejected the defendant's claim that the authorities cited by the
trial court were inapplicable because these cases were based on the application
of Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which Missouri has not adopted.8" Instead, the
court concluded that Section 490.065 of the Missouri Revised Statutes was
"virtually identical" to FRE 702.8

75. Haas v. Seekell, 538 So. 2d 1333, 1336-37 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989).
76. Simmons v. Mullen, 331 A.2d 892, 899-900 (Pa. 1974).
77. 625 A.2d 326 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1993), cert. granted,634 A.2d 47 (1993),
aff'd in part,rev'd in part,645 A.2d 1147 (1994).
78. Id. at330.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 331.

81. Id.
82. Landers v. Chrysler Corp., 963 S.W.2d 275, 280 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
83. Id.at 279-80 (citing Hutchison v. American Family Mut. Ins. Co., 514 N.W.2d
882 (Iowa 1994); Madrid v. University of California, 737 P.2d 74 (N.M. 1987);
Cunningham v. Montgomery, 921 P.2d 1355 (Or. Ct. App. 1996); Howle v.
PYA/Monarch, Inc. 344 S.E.2d 157 (S.C. Ct. App. 1986); Seneca Falls Greenhouse &
Nursery v. Layton, 389 S.E.2d 184 (Va. Ct. App. 1990)).
84. Landers, 963 S.W.2d at 281-82.

85. Id.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/4
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Using Section 490.065 as its guide, the court evaluated the admissibility of
the psychologist's testimony.8 Section 490.065 permits the admission of expert
testimony if it is helpful to the trier of fact.8 7 The admissibility of expert opinion
is generally a matter of discretion for the trial court."8 In this case, the Labor and
Industrial Relations Commission, as fact finder, had discretion to determine the
expert's qualifications to testify on specific matters.8 9
The court turned to statutory interpretation to determine what was needed
to qualify a witness as an expert. The court concluded that because the statute
used the word "or," a person may qualify as an expert based on any of the areas
listed in the statute." That is, a witness could be qualified as an expert based on
her "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education." 9' Thus, the court
found there was no requirement that a witness be qualified as an expert solely
on the basis of her education. 92 The court found that other Missouri cases firmly
established the premise that medical personnel, other than medical doctors, may
be qualified to testify on medical matters.93
Applying this interpretation of the rule to the facts at hand, the court held
that Dr. Wetzel's knowledge, skill, training, and experience in the area of
neuropsychology allowed him to testify on the causation of plaintiffs brain
injuries.94 As such, the court found that there was sufficient evidence in the
record for the Commission to conclude that the plaintiff's disabilities were
caused by the work-related injury and denied the defendant's point of appeal.95
V. COMMENT

The issue of psychologists testifying on medical causation has created a
nationwide jurisdictional debate. The solution, however, may be ascertained
from within the governing rule of FRE 702. Although many courts have turned
to outside sources and policy reasons, the rule governing admission of expert
testimony clearly provides the answer.
The problem which plagues many jurisdictions is that they are longing to
create and apply hard and fast rules, especially in evidentiary rulings. However,
even a cursory look at the rule governing admissibility of expert testimony
indicates the test is individualized. The test requires the court to evaluate the
86. Id.
87. Id.

88. Id. at 281.
89. Id.

90. Id.
91. Mo. REV. STAT. § 490.065 (1994) (emphasis added).
92. Landers v. Chrysler Corp., 963 S.W.2d 275, 281 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
93. Id. See Cebula v. Benoit, 652 S.W.2d 304, 308 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983) (finding

medical personnel could qualify as expert medical witnesses).
94. Landers, 963 S.W.2d at 282.
95. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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particularwitness and determine whether he or she is qualified to provide
testimony as an expert. Specifically, there are five areas to be analyzed: the
witness's knowledge, skill, experience, training, and education.96 Naturally, in
some areas, general characteristics will emerge which will automatically qualify
certain witnesses as experts. However, that will not always be the case. In
certain areas, such as the ability of a psychologist to testify on medical
causation, an independent evaluation of each case is the best approach.
Although the Missouri court followed the majority approach by allowing
the particular psychologist to testify, it is critical to evaluate how the Missouri
court reached this decision. Nowhere in the opinion did the court express the
notion that all psychologists are capable of giving an expert opinion on medical
causation. Rather, the court looked at the particular psychologist and determined
that his characteristics, including his skill and experience, qualified him to give
his expert opinion concerning the medical cause of the plaintiff s brain injury.97
In doing so, the court implicitly followed what the admissibility rule requires:
a case-by-case approach.
Undoubtedly this case-by-case approach will be criticized as a waste of
judicial resources. However valid that criticism may be, it remains clear that the
rule mandates the case-by-case approach. It also remains important, however,
to remember that one part of the expert admissibility test is quite liberal. This
part merely requires that the expert's testimony is helpful to the fact finder. This
is consistent with the increasingly liberal approach of the Federal Rules of
Evidence to the admission of all evidence. However, the second part of the test
is just as important: the witness must be qualified as an expert. This too is
arguably a liberal test. The rule lists several broad categories of possible ways
a witness may qualify himself as an expert.
One must not forget the protection device that accompanies this liberal rule:
the weight to be given to the evidence. This device may still impact the
evidence. Simply because evidence is admitted does not mean the fact finder
must believe it. This is of obvious importance when the issue is largely based
on expert opinion.
Jurisdictions which have adopted a strict policy of not allowing
psychologists to testify on medical issues have created a dangerous precedent.
Essentially, these courts are creating a "best evidence rule" that applies to expert
witnesses. These courts are implying that only those best qualified may testify.
That is, if the issue is a medical issue such as medical causation, then only
medical doctors can give their expert opinion. However, the only "best evidence
rule" the American legal system follows is one that applies to written
documents. It has been denied from application to other principles simply
because that is not the focus of our legal system. Our system focuses on liberal

96. Mo. REv. STAT. § 490.065 (1994) (emphasis added).
97. Landers v. Chrysler Corp., 963 S.W.2d 275, 282 (Mo. Ct. App. 1997).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol63/iss4/4
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admissibility and a desire to ascertain the truth. Whatever one's belief is on a
"best expert witness" rule, there is simply no support for such a rule within the
expert testimony admissibility rule.
This result in Landersis consistent with recent decisions by the Missouri
courts. In 1983, in Cebula v. Benoit, a Missouri court found that medical
personnel, other than medical doctors, may be qualified to testify as medical
experts.9" The use of the word "may" is crucial to an understanding of how these
types of decision are reached. There is no bright line rule that all medical
personnel may testify. Rather, courts should look at the various characteristics
possessed by each particular witness to see if they qualify to testify as an expert.
The rule in Landers specifies that whether someone qualifies as an expert
witness is based on overall qualifications and not solely on the possession of a
certain academic degree. When the scope of a psychologist's testimony was
questioned on a different, yet related issue, the D.C. Circuit stated:
The determination ofa psychologist's competence to render an expert
opinion based on his findings as to the presence or absence of mental
disease or defect must depend upon the nature and extent of his
knowledge. It does not depend upon his claim to the tittle
psychologist. And that determination ... must be left in each case to
the traditional discretion of the trial court .... [T]he lack of a medical
degree... [is] not [an] automatic disqualification[ ] .... The trial
judge should make a finding in respect to the individual qualification
of each challenged expert. "
Although this reasoning was applied to the issue of the presence of a mental
defect, it applies equally to the issue of medical causation. The focus of the test
in FRE 702 is on whether the witness has adequate qualifications. It is irrelevant
what issue is being tested; whether it is the existence of a mental defect or
medical causation, the test should be applied uniformly. It would be inconsistent
to find that for the existence of a medical condition, a court would consider a
psychologist's qualifications; yet for medical causation issues, merely the title
of psychologist would prevent the witness from being a expert witness on
medical causationissues.
The presumptuous notion of some courts that all psychologists are
unqualified to testify about medical causation is unfounded."° As explained by
a leading scholar on evidence:
The common law.., does not require that the expert witness on a
medical subject shall be a person duly licensed to practicemedicine.

98. 652 S.W.2d 304 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983).
99. Jenkins v. United States, 307 F.2d 637, 645-46 (D.C. Cir. 1962).
100. See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1998
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[S]uch a rule is ill-advised, first, because the line between chemistry,
biology, and medicine is too indefinite to admit of a practicable
separation of topics and witnesses; and, second, because some of the
most capable investigators have probably not needed or cared to
obtain a license to practice medicine. '0'
Thus, it is even more clear that a psychologist's ability to testify about medical
causation, or any other issue, cannot be a bright line rule to be applied in every
circumstance. Rather, the decision should be based on a particular
psychologist's qualifications on a particular issue. This is the standard for every
expert witness determination. The medical field's desire to attach vague labels
to certain positions should have no impact on the expert witness determination.
Unfortunately, jurisdictions adopting bright line approaches may tend to
reflect the legal "snowball" phenomenon. That is, one court reaches a result and
another court follows its illogical reasoning as the only discussion on the matter.
However, like the Landers decision, some courts implicitly appear to conduct
independent, case-by-case evaluations even though not directly stating that
approach.
For example, in the recent decision of Huntoon v. TCI Cablevision of
Colorado, Inc., the Colorado Court of Appeals refused to qualify a
neuropsychologist as an expert on the medical cause of a brain injury." The
court looked at the differences in the Colorado statutes defining the practices of
medicine and psychology to reach its decision. Yet, the court also stated:
"Here, the neuropsychologist did not demonstrate the necessary qualifications
to render an opinion concerning causation." 103 This decision seems to hint at a
case-by-case evaluation. Hence, in subsequent cases, perhaps lawyers will pay
closer attention to demonstrating the precise qualities the neuropsychologist
possesses that will enable him to testify on medical causation. However, courts'
reliance on statutory definitions somewhat weakens this possibility.

101. 2 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 569

(Chadbourn rev. 1979).
102. Huntoon v. TCI Cablevision, 948 P.2d 33, 35 (Colo. Ct. App. 1997).
103. Id. at 35.
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VI. CONCLUSION

The rule governing the admissibility of expert witness testimony is neither
convoluted nor confusing. The rule clearly sets forth two requirements. These
requirements apply equally to all expert issues, including the issue of medical
causation. The rule designates no one class as being more expert on certain
issues than other classes of expert witnesses. Therefore, courts need to stop
interpreting FRE 702 to give the rule hidden agendas that not are required.
Issues concerning whether a particular psychologist may testify on medical
causation must be decided individually. To adopt any other rule would dilute
the meaning and the significance of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The decision in Landers does not require deep scholarly thought. Yet,
nonetheless, the Missouri Court of Appeals should be commended for being one
of the first jurisdictions to interpret the issue correctly. The court applied FRE
702 in its intended manner. The rule decided in Landers acts as suspenders,
only further supporting what has always been required under FRE 702.
STACEY A. TURLEY
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